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INTRODUCTION

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

On January 2,2012, Jeffrey Reid was driving a Blue 2007 Toyota FJ
Cruiser owned jointly by himself and his wife, Sandra Snyder-Reid, when he was
stopped by Officer Dennis Stinebaugh for speeding and in response to a report that
a man driving a similar vehicle was allegedly dumping plant material thought to be
marijuana. R. Vol. 1, p. 113, para. 12. After arresting Jeffrey Reid, Idaho State
Police seized the vehicle he had been driving. R. Vol. 1, p. 114, para. 19.
Following Mr. Reid's arrest, police went to his home address, arrested his
wife, Ms. Snyder-Reid, searched their home, and ultimately both individuals were
charged for allegedly violating I.C. 37-2732A, manufacturing marijuana within
1000 feet ofa school, and I.C. 37-2732B, trafficking marijuana within 1000 feet of
a school. R. Vol. 1, pp. 121-22; R. Vol. 1, pp. 135-36.
After establishing that the marijuana was only for Ms. Snyder-Reid's
personal use, Ms. Snyder-Reid pled guilty to manufacturing a controlled substance
in violation ofI.C. § 37-2732(a)(b). R. Vol. 1, p. 142. Mr. Reid then pled guilty
to delivery of a controlled substance in violation of I.C. § 37 -2732(A)(l )(A). R.
Vol. 1, p. 129. Both were placed on probation by the Honorable John Luster on
-1-

August 6, 2012, and their judgments and sentences are being withheld. R. Vol. 1,
p. 142; R. Vol. 1, p. 129. Judge Luster assessed court fines and costs in the
amount of$750.00, and restitution to the forensics lab for $100.00. R. Vol 1, pp.
130,143.
On January 19, 2012, the State filed a civil complaint seeking forfeiture of
the seized vehicle. R. Vol. 1, p. 6. Despite promptly answering the State's civil
complaint against the vehicle, R. Vol. 1, pp. 11, 14, and continuing to make
payments on the outstanding loan, R. Vol. 1, p. 162, para. 3, Mr. Reid and Ms.
Snyder-Reid were deprived of the use of the vehicle while the State placed the
issue on the back-burner.
Over the course of three months following their arrests, Jeffrey Reid and
Sandra Snyder-Reid waited for the opportunity to object to the seizure of this
vehicle, during which time the State failed to bring the matter up for hearing. R.
Vol. 1, p. 23, para. 2-8. After three months of waiting, Mr. Reid and Ms. SnyderReid, as claimants, moved to dismiss the civil action against the vehicle, which
was initially granted by the Honorable Benjamin Simpson on April 20, 2012, and
then vacated later that same day. R. Vol. 1, p. 22; R. Vol. 1, p. 26. Ultimately, the
motion was denied on June 12,2012. R. Vol. 1, p. 29.
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After yet another prompt response from Mr. Reid and Ms. Snyder-Reid
asking for reconsideration on June 26,2012, R. Vol. 1, p. 36, the State ignored the
matter for another five months. R. Vol. 1, p. 83. On November 16,2012, ten
months after the State filed its civil complaint, and nearly three and a half months
after sentencing in the criminal matter, the State filed its opposition to the motion
for reconsideration, R. Vol. 1, p. 146, and also filed a motion for summary
judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 83. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment,
the Reids argued that forfeiture of the vehicle was excessive in violation of the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. According to Kelley Blue
Book,! the value of this vehicle ranges from $13,956.00 for the trade in value ofa
similar vehicle in "fair" condition, to $19,156.00 if selling the vehicle in
"excellent" condition to a private party, and $21,206.00 if looking to buy the
vehicle from a used car dealer. Kelley Blue Book, http://www.kbb.com/toyota/
fj-cruiserl2007-toyota-fj-cruiserlsport-utility-2d/ (last visited July 7,2013). In the
end, the District Court granted summary judgment as to forfeiture of the vehicle.
R. Vol. 1, p. 228.
The Kelley Blue Book is an online resource typically utilized in the
automobile industry to assess the value of vehicles based on a number of specific
factors including geographical region, whether the buyer or seller is a dealership,
odometer reading, and the vehicle's options, among many others.
1
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B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The State originally filed their complaint on January 19, 2012 seeking civil
forfeiture of the vehicle, the gardening equipment, and a small amount of U.S.
currency that was all seized during the search of the vehicle and the Reid's home
under I.C. § 37-2744. R. Vol. 1, p. 6. On January 19,2012 the State also issued a
summons regarding the forfeiture action and described what the plaintiff and/or
their attorney must file regarding a "written response." R. Vol. 1, p. 51. Soon
thereafter, on February 27,2012, Ms. Reid filed her answer arguing that the
hydroponic growing equipment was not "drug paraphernalia" as defined by the
State and denied the State had a legal claim to the seized vehicle and/or to the
small amount of currency. R. Vol. 1, p. 15. Mr. Reid did the same. R. Vol. 1, p.
12.
After three months of inactivity from the State, defense counsel for both Mr.
and Ms. Reid filed a joint motion to dismiss the State's complaint. R. Vol. 1, p.
22. In support of this motion, the assertion was made that the State had failed to
give the forfeiture proceeding precedent as required by Idaho Code 372744(d)(3)(D). R. Vol. 1, p. 23. No responsive pleadings were filed by the State.
On April 20, 2012, the District Court granted the defense's motion to dismiss. R.
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Vol. 1, p. 68. Then, on that same day, the District Court again signed the order
dismissing the action but writes in "vacated - pending hearing 5/24112 lsi
Benjamin R. Simpson." R. Vol. 1, p. 72.
On May 24,2012, the District Court heard argument first from the
defendants. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 5. They argued their motion, requested that the District
Court dismiss the State's complaint, and objected to any argument being brought
by the State because of their failure to answer under Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 7 ("I.R.C.P."). Tr. Vol. 1, p. 10. Denying the defendant's
objections, the District Court heard from the State, which argued for the first time
that it did not have an obligation under the statute to bring up for hearing their
action within 30 days. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 10-16. No argument was made regarding the
form of the pleadings. More specifically, the State did not file a written objection
andlor argue to the court regarding the form of the defendant's answer or that the
defendant's answer was not a "written statement" sworn to by the "attorney of
record" under I.R.C.P. ll(c). See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(B) and I.R.C.P. ll(c).
On June 12,2012, the District Court denied the defendant's motion not
based upon anything argued or presented to the court by the State, but because in
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the District Court's view, "Reid has not filed a verified answer.. ... [s]imply put,
this argument is not ripe." See R. Vol. 1, p. 34.
On June 26,2012 a motion for reconsideration was filed. R. Vol. 1, p. 36.
Citing both the rule and Idaho precedent, the defense argued that the defendant's
written answer filed by the party's "attorney of record" was a "Written Statement"
under LR.C.P. 11, and even ifit wasn't, there was no objection by the state to the
form of the pleading and therefore their objection is waived. R. Vol. 1, pp. 39-41.
On November 16, nearly five months later, and more than three months after
sentencing in the related criminal cases, the State filed their responsive pleading.
R. Vol. 1, p. 146. On this same day, the State filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 83.
Four days later, on November 20, defendants filed a motion for the return of
the seized vehicle, citing the significant amount of time that had passed since the
initiation of the forfeiture action. R. Vol. 1, p. 158. The State objected to this
motion on November 28, R. Vol. 1, p. 188, and defendants responded to the
Motion for Summary Judgment on December 4,2012. R. Vol. 1, p. 198.
Defendant's Opposition to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment raised
many significant issues, including: the existence of disputed facts concerning
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whether the vehicle was used in the furtherance of criminal activity, R. Vol. 1, p.
199; the existence of disputed facts concerning whether the plant material
observed in the vehicle was marijuana, R. Vol. 1, p. 201; and the excessiveness of
forfeiture of the vehicle in relation to the crime, id.
On January 9,2013, the court denied defendant's motions for
reconsideration, R. Vol. 1, p. 225, and return of the seized vehicle, R. Vol. 1, p.
223, and granted partial motion for summary judgment, granting the State
forfeiture as to the seized vehicle. R. Vol. 1, p. 228.
On February 21,2013, the court entered a judgment of forfeiture in response
to the parties' stipulation as to forfeiture of the currency.2 R. Vol. 1, p. 252. As
for the vehicle itself, it remains in the custody of the Kootenai County Sheriffs
Office and the Reids continue to pay their auto 10an. 3

By stipulation of the parties, the State received $1000 in fees and the
Reids received $700 of the previously confiscated $1,700.
2

In regard to criminal matters, Case No. CR-12-148 (Sandra Snyder-Reid)
and Case No. CR-12-00159 (Jeffrey Reid), the state also brought a motion for
criminal forfeiture seeking the confiscation of several firearms that were found in
the residence after a search. The defense filed a motion to dismiss that motion,
arguing that the criminal forfeiture statue as applied was unconstitutional, along
with several due process challenges. On November 19,2012, and after hearing
oral argument, the Honorable Judge Luster dismissed the State's motion seeking
the criminal forfeiture and ordered the property to be returned back to the Reids.
R. Vol. 1, p. 157.
3
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On April 3, 2013 defendants filed notice of appeal. R. Vol. 1, p. 258.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 1,2012, Officer Dennis Stinebaugh responded to a report that
an individual was allegedly dumping marijuana on private property. R. Vol. 1, p.
112, para. 4. Officer Stinebaugh located the suspect vehicle based on the
description given in the report and made a traffic stop, seizing Jeffrey Reid and the
Blue Toyota FJ Cruiser he was driving. R. Vol. 1, p. 113, para. 10. During the
course of this stop, the officer indicated that Mr. Reid had been reportedly
dumping marijuana on the side of the road. R. Vol. 1, p. 113, para. 12. Mr. Reid
remained cooperative, and ultimately followed the officer's direction to allow a
search of the vehicle. R. Vol. 1, p. 113, para. 13. While looking into the rear
compartment of the Cruiser, Officer Sinebaugh saw and smelled plant material that
appeared to be marijuana. R. Vol. 1, p. 113, para. 14-16. Mr. Reid was arrested,
read his Miranda rights, and incarcerated. R. Vol. 1, p. 113, para. 17. The FJ
Cruiser was towed by Sunset Towing, and placed in the control of Kootenai
County Sheriff's Office. R. Vol. 1, p. 114, para. 19.
After Mr. Reid's arrest, a number of law enforcement personnel went to the
residence ofMr. Reid and his wife, Sandra Snyder-Reid. R. Vol. 1, p. 114, para.

-8-

21. Ms. Snyder-Reid pulled into her driveway while officers hovered outside of
her home. R. Vol. 1, p. 106, para. 7-9. Upon her arrival, Ms. Snyder-Reid was
directed towards Detective Mark Ellis, who informed her that they wanted to
conduct a search of her home. R. Vol. 1, p. 107, para. 11.
Ms. Snyder-Reid asked if she could consult her son, to which the detective
responded that this was her home and that she needed to make a decision
immediately. R. Vol. 1, p. 107, para. 12. Ms. Snyder-Reid declined, and asked the
Detective to secure a warrant. R. Vol. 1, p. 107, para. 13. Unsatisfied, the
detective warned Ms. Snyder-Reid that a judge would treat her more harshly if she
required the police to get a warrant, and pressed further for her permission. R.
Vol. I, p. 196, para. 2.
The Detective made it clear that he would not let Ms. Snyder-Reid go unless
he received her permission to enter her home. Id. Ms. Snyder-Reid gave her
consent because she feared retaliation from the justice system if she required law
enforcement to obtain a warrant from the court. Id.
During the search of the home, Ms. Snyder-Reid was cooperative, and
explained that the marijuana was for her personal use. R. Vol. 1, p. 108. para. 26.
The officers uncovered drying marijuana and growing equipment in the garage and
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a nearby shed, a pipe for smoking in the home, and some cash along with some
bills in a sunroom. 4 R. Vol. 1, p. 108-109. These items, among other unrelated
items, were confiscated and Ms. Snyder-Reid was arrested. R. Vol. 1, p. 109, para.
31.
Both Mr. Reid and his wife, Ms. Snyder-Reid, were arrested and jailed for
allegedly violating I.e. 37-2732A, manufacturing marijuana within 1000 feet ofa
school, and I.e. 37-2732B, trafficking marijuana within 1000 feet ofa school. R.
Vol. 1, pp. 121-22; R. Vol. 1, pp. 135-36. Both plead guilty to lesser charges
(delivery of marijuana and manufacture of marijuana, respectively) and were
placed on probation by the Honorable John Luster on August 6, 2012; the
judgments for both pleas have been withheld. R. Vol. 1, p. 129; R. Vol. 1, p. 142.
The maximum penalties are life in prison and a $25,000.00 fine for both charges.
Judge Luster assessed court fines and costs in the amount of$750.00, and
restitution to the forensics lab for $100.00. R. Vol 1, pp. 130, 143.

It should be noted that the sunroom was entirely void of marijuana
paraphernalia.
4
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE FORFEITURE OF THE
VEHICLE IS EXCESSIVE IN RELATION TO THE CRIME
AND VIOLATES THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE OF THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE VEHICLE WAS
NOT USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISTRIBUTION OR
RECEIPT OF MARIJUANA.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo whether constitutional requirements have been
satisfied. Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney v. Reese, 142 Idaho 893, 897,
136 P.3d 364, 368 (2006). Whether the property was used in violation ofLC. §
37-2744 is a question of fact reviewed under a substantial evidence standard.
Richardson v. One 1972 GMC Pickup, 121 Idaho 599, 601, 826 P.2d 1311, 1313

(1992).
IIIII
IIIII
IIIII
IIIII
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ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE FORFEITURE OF THE
VEHICLE IS EXCESSIVE IN RELATION TO THE CRIME
AND VIOLATES THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE OF THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT.

The civil forfeiture statute under which the Reids' vehicle was forfeited, I.C.

§ 37-2744, is punitive and thus requires Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines
analysis - an analysis which the forfeiture cannot withstand.
The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."

(Emphasis added). In determining whether the Idaho civil forfeiture statute
requires Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court
has followed the reasoning adopted by the United States Supreme Court. Idaho
Dept. Of Law Enforcement By & Through Cade v. Free, 126 Idaho 422, 424, 885

P.2d 381, 383 (1994). Specifically, this Court has held that real property is subject
to forfeiture under I.C. § 37-2744A, which is "virtually identical" to the federal
statute which was analyzed by the United States Supreme Court in Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), and thus, the state statute is punitive at least in
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part, requiring analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Id.
In reaching this conclusion, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the United
States Supreme Court's three-part analysis holding that: (1) "the Eighth
Amendment proscriptions, including that against excessive fines, apply in both
criminal and civil contexts[,]" (2) "the question is not whether the forfeiture is
civil or criminal but whether the forfeiture constitutes punishment, at least in some
part[, and]" (3) that this analysis must be done in evaluating the excessiveness in
the forfeiture of real property. Free, 126 Idaho at 424,885 P.2d at 383.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has extended this application to personal
property forfeitures under I.C. § 37-2744 - the authority used to justify forfeiture
of the Reid's vehicle in the current case. Nez Perce Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney v.

Reese, 142 Idaho 893, 898-99, 136 P.3d 364, 369-70 (Ct. App. 2006). In
justifying the extension of this analysis from real property to personal property,
the Court in Reese used reasoning identical to that of the Idaho Supreme Court's
in Free. See, id. More specifically, the Court in Reese reasoned that the United
States Supreme Court had extended the applicability of Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines analysis to a statute identical to the Idaho statute in question. Id.
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Further, the court reasoned that "[t]he inclusion of an innocent-owner
defense in a forfeiture statute reveals legislative intent to punish those involved in
drug trafficking." Reese, 142 Idaho at 898, 136 P.3d at 369 (internal citations
omitted). As such, there is no question that the forfeiture of the Reid's vehicle is
punitive and therefore must undergo Excessive Fines analysis to be deemed
constitutional.
"The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines
Clause is the principle of proportionality - the amount of the forfeiture must bear

some relationship to the gravity of the offense it is designed to punish." Reese,
142 Idaho at 899, 136 P.3d at 370 (emphasis added). "To determine the
proportionality of the forfeiture, relevant factors include, but are not limited to, the
fair market value of the property, the intangible or subjective value ofthe
property, and the hardship to the defendant." Reese, 142 Idaho at 899, 136 P.3d at
370.
With these concepts in mind, the court below was charged with the task of
considering impact of the forfeiture by looking at (1) the value of the vehicle, (2)
the Reid's economic circumstances, and (3) the hardship caused by the loss of the
vehicle, then evaluating whether such an impact is justified by looking at (1) the
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other penalties imposed in the related criminal issue, (2) the connection between
the property and the offense, and (3) the "harm caused by the marijuana-growing
operation [and, (4) the Reid's] motive for participating in the operation." Reese,
142 at 900, 136 P.3d at 371. If the court then comes to the conclusion that the
forfeiture (and the impact it would have) is grossly disproportionate to the crime,
then such forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive. Id.
While Idaho has not yet applied the Excessive Fines analysis to the
forfeiture of a vehicle for marijuana offenses, the State of Wisconsin just this year
decided a case markedly similar to that of the Reids. In Peloza, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals evaluated whether the forfeiture of a 2009 Mitsubishi Lancer
GTS valued at approximately $16,000.00 was unconstitutional because it was
excessive. Wisconsin v. Peloza, 2013 WL 1579923. The owner of the vehicle was
the subject of an investigation by Milwaukee's Metropolitan Drug Enforcement
Group for suspicion of engaging in drug activity. Id at 2. After attempting to sell
approximately seven ounces of marijuana to an undercover officer for $1,855.00,
Peloza was arrested and ultimately plead guilty to possession. Id at 3. Availing
himself of a deferred prosecution agreement, Peloza successfully completed all
requirements, paid a $250 fine, and had his conviction expunged. Id.
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The Wisconsin Court ultimately held that it was "patently obvious that
forfeiture ofPeloza's car [was] excessive." Id at 7. In so finding, the court noted
that Peloza's offense did not include violence, did not result in injury, and was not
gang related. Id at 8. Further, Peloza was not a large-scale drug dealer, had no
prior criminal record, and his conviction was expunged after the payment of a
small fine. Id.
Other courts have found forfeiture to be excessive when the vehicle was not
obtained by proceeds of the crime. United States v. One 1992 Isuzu Trooper VIN
No. JACDH58W3N79112571, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273-74 (M.D. Ala. 1999).

And when the connection between the vehicle and the offense is somewhat
attenuated. In re Forfeiture of 1990 Chevrolet Blazer VIN:IGNCT18Z3L8139145,
684 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that relevant factors
include: "(1) whether the use of the property in the offense was deliberate and
planned or merely incidental and fortuitous; (2) whether the property was
important to the success of the illegal activity; (3) the time during which the
property was illegally used and the spatial extent of its use; (4) whether its illegal
use was an isolated event or had been repeated; and (5) whether the purpose of
acquiring, maintaining or using the property was to carry out the offense.").
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When we consider the facts in the Reids' case, it is patently obvious that
forfeiture of their car is excessive. Of particular relevance in the present case is
the economic hardship experienced by the Reids, and the merely tenuous
relationship between crimes the Reids pled to, the damage caused by the crimes,
and the use of the vehicle in furthering those crimes.
As was the case in Peloza, the Reids did not commit a violent offense, did
not cause harm to the community, are not drug dealers or gang members, and have
the opportunity to successfully comply with the terms of their plea agreement and
receive a dismissal if they pay a nominal fee to the court. R. Vol 1, pp. 130, 143.
The motive behind the Reids' illegal activity was simply for Ms. Reid's
personal use. R. Vol. 1, p. 108 para. 26. There is no issue of sale, there is no issue
of distributing but for the husband delivering to his wife, and there is no exchange
of money or proceeds from the activity. The manufacture and delivery charges
resulting from this case are based on activities within the home and did not
involve the outside community. This being the case, the use of the vehicle was
merely fortuitous, was not necessary to the success of the illegal activity, was not
an integral part of a deliberate plan to carry out the illegal activity, and was not
owned in order to further the purpose of the activity.
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In addition to the merely tenuous relationship between the crimes the Reids
pled to, the use of the vehicle in furthering those crimes, and the absence of
damage to the community, it is also important to note the excessive hardship
experienced by the Reids as a result of the forfeiture. The Reids refinanced their
vehicle in 2009 for $13,535.61. R. Vol. 1, p. 176. Over the next few years, they
made payments of$118.00 twice a month, up until and even after the vehicle was
seized. Id. To date the Reids remain current on their loan, having paid just over
$4,000.00 since the vehicle's seizure. See, id. According to Kelley Blue Book,
the value of this vehicle ranges from $13,956.00 for the trade in value, all the way
to $19,156.00 if selling to a private party.
It is anticipated that the government will argue that the forfeiture of the

vehicle is not excessive in light of the statutory maximum sentence under the
delivery statute, I.e. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A), which imposes a maximum penalty of
life imprisonment or a fine of not more than $25,000.00, or both. However, the
courts have clearly established that excessive fines analysis is a fact-specific
inquiry. See, e.g. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337 (1998)
(discussing not only the crime committed but the facts weighing on the gravity of
the offense in the particular instance). As such, the sentences imposed by the
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court in the criminal cases is far more informative than the statutory maximum
sentences, as that court had the opportunity to hear the facts, determine the
severity of the offense, and impose appropriate sentences.
The Reids continue to experience a logistical hardship. R. Vol. 1, p. 162,
Ms. Snyder-Reid explains that she and her husband work in Coeur d' Alene and
Spokane, respectively, and that both of their employments require that they have
use of a vehicle making car-pooling, public transportation, and the sharing of one
vehicle unrealistic alternatives. Further, Ms. Reid's probation officer and Dr.
Daniel Hayes have stressed the importance that Ms. Reid continue to work outside
the home for her psychological well-being. R. Vol. 1, p. 162.

As such, the

forfeiture of the Reid's vehicle is entirely disproportionate to the crimes they
committed and thus is in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment and is unconstitutional.
IIIII
IIIII
IIIII
IIIII
IIIII
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE VEHICLE WAS
NOT USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISTRIBUTION OR
RECEIPT OF MARIJUANA.

The district court's grant of partial summary judgment must be overturned
because the record is void of evidence suggesting that the Reids' vehicle was used
for the purpose of distribution or receipt of marijuana. Whether the property was
used for the purpose of distribution or receipt of marijuana is a question of fact
reviewed under a substantial evidence standard. One 1972 GMC Pickup, 121
Idaho at 601,826 P.2d at 1313.
The statute under which the government seeks forfeiture of the Reids'
vehicle states that civil forfeiture is appropriate where the vehicle "is used, or
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transpOliation,
delivery, receipt, possession or concealment,for the purpose of distribution or

receiptoffmarijuanaJ." I.C. § 37-2744(a)(4) (emphasis added). In Ada Cnty
Prosecuting A tty v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 298 P. 3d 245
(2013), the Idaho Supreme Court found the statute to be unambiguous, and thus
the plain meaning must be applied. Id. More specifically, the Court found that the
phrase "for the purpose of distribution or receipt of [marijuana]" modifies "to

-20-

transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt,
possession or concealment .... " Id.
Thus, for the forfeiture of the Reids' vehicle to be authorized, the
government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not just
used for the transportation of the marijuana, but that the transportation was "for
the purpose of distribution or receipt of [marijuana]"; a burden which the
government cannot meet. See, Idaho Dept. OfLaw Enforcement v. $34,000

u.s.

Currency, 121 Idaho 211, 216,824 P.2d 142, 147 (et. App. 1991).

The courts have been clear that the purpose of civil forfeiture statutes is to
provide punishment (in which case excessive fines analysis is appropriate), and to
deter illegal activity by "impos[ing] an economic penalty by rendering the illegal
behavior unprofitable, and deterring such behavior by preventing further illegal
use of the property. Id at 217, 824 P.2d at 148 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-87 (1974)). In the Reids' case, neither goal

is realized by the forfeiture of their vehicle because the Reids did not derive a
profit from their crimes and the vehicle was not used in furtherance of their
cnmes.
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In the present case, the district cOUli did not make a memorandum decision
with findings of fact. R. Vol. 1, p. 220. This being the case, the best indication of
what the court considered in reaching its conclusion can be found in the transcript
of the hearing for summary judgment. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 37-41. During this hearing,
the court indicated that there was no genuine issue of material fact that marijuana
plant material was found in the vehicle, and that based on this fact, summary
judgment as to the forfeiture of the vehicle is granted. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 40, 11. 14-17;
p. 41, ll. 1-18. There is no indication that the court considered anything other than
the presence of marijuana in deciding that the statute was satisfied. This is
entirely contrary to the opinion out of the Idaho Supreme Court which stated
unequivocally that mere transportation (i.e. possession) is not enough; the vehicle
at issue must be used "for the purpose of distribution or receipt of[marijuana}."
2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho at 355, 298 P. 3d at 249. The record does

not indicate that there is substantial evidence justifying the district court's
conclusion that the Reids' vehicle was used in violation ofLC. § 37-2744(a)(4).
Quite the opposite, Ms. Reid pled guilty to manufacture of marijuana in her
home and her husband, Mr. Reid, pled guilty to distributing that marijuana to her.
R. Vol. 1, pp. 142, 129. This fact forecloses the possibility that the vehicle could
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have been rationally connected to this activity "for the purpose of distribution or
receipt of [marijuana]" because both distribution and receipt happened within the
home, the same site where the manufacturing took place. To find otherwise, the
court would have to ignore the holding in 2007 Legendary Motorcycle and allow
mere transportation (i.e. possession) to be sufficient for forfeiture.
CONCLUSION

The district court erred when it granted partial summary judgment
approving of the forfeiture of the Reids' vehicle because this constitutes a
punishment that is excessive in relation to the crimes committed, and because the
vehicle was not used for the purpose of distribution or receipt of the marijuana.
Thus, the forfeiture of the vehicle is unconstitutional and unjustified. For the
above mentioned, it is therefore requested that this court reverse and remand this
case for re-sentencing.
DATED this 29th day of July, 2013.
VIETH LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

Attorney for Jeffrey Reid
and Sandra Snyder-Reid
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